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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 I.  Introduction, Factual Background and Procedural History 
 This appeal arises in a Federal Employers' Liability 
Act (FELA) case in which the employer is New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc.  To understand the germane facts one must in the 
first instance know a bit about New Jersey Transit train design.  
On New Jersey Transit trains, or at least on the one involved 
here, cars are connected to each other by vestibules, which are 
enclosed areas located just outside the passenger seating 
compartments of each car.  Thus, each car contains two 
vestibules, one at each end.  Each vestibule, in turn, contains 
three doors -- one leading into the passenger compartment, the 
other two leading out of the train onto the station platform.1  
Railroad employees and passengers walk through the vestibules to 
pass from one car to the next, and to exit from the car to the 
platform and vice versa.  While anyone may open the doors leading 
into the passenger compartments, railroad employees open and 
close the doors to the station platform by operating mechanisms 
located within the vestibule. 
 On March 10, 1992, appellant Thomas Fashauer was 
performing his usual duties as brakeman on a New Jersey Transit 
                     
1
.  Of course, depending on which side of the platform the train 
arrives, one of the two side doors opens. 
  
train en route from Lindenwold, New Jersey, to Atlantic City, New 
Jersey.  These duties included entering the vestibule, opening 
and closing the doors leading from the train to the station 
platform, and signaling the engineer that the platform was clear 
and that the train could depart.  He began work in Atlantic City 
at 1:00 p.m. and made several round trips. 
 It was raining heavily, and the rug on the vestibule 
floor was soaked when the train arrived at the Atco station on 
the last run of the day.  Fashauer opened the doors, exited the 
train, and, after checking the stairs for passengers running 
late, returned to the train and signaled the engineer to leave.  
Fashauer then shut the doors.  The train jerked twice, once upon 
leaving the station and once soon after.  Fashauer was not 
holding on to the handrails at the time, and he slipped on the 
wet floor, striking his left shoulder against the wall.  He 
testified that he was in agony at the time, and he immediately 
reported the incident to the conductor.  At the conductor's 
behest, Fashauer rested for the remainder of the trip.  He 
suffered serious injuries to his shoulder as a result of the 
accident. 
 On August 21, 1992, Fashauer filed a complaint against 
New Jersey Transit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, alleging that his injury was proximately 
caused by New Jersey Transit's negligence.  Specifically, the 
complaint charged New Jersey Transit with negligently maintaining 
  
certain seals between the cars, and further alleged that the 
defective seals allowed rain to seep into the vestibule, creating 
a dangerous slippery condition on a rainy day.  He sought relief 
pursuant to the FELA, which governs actions by railroad employees 
against railroads for damages arising out of job-related 
injuries.   
 The case was tried between March 7, 1994, and March 16, 
1994.  New Jersey Transit defended against Fashauer's claims by 
presenting evidence that the seals were not defective, the 
slippery condition was purely the result of the rainy weather, 
and Fashauer failed to act with due care while walking through 
the vestibule.  On March 16, the jury returned a verdict finding 
that New Jersey Transit was negligent and that its negligence 
contributed to the injuries.  It awarded Fashauer damages of 
$71,320 in past lost earnings and $100,000 for pain and 
suffering.  However, the jury awarded nothing for future lost 
earnings.  Finally, the jury determined that Fashauer was 50% 
responsible for his injuries.  Under FELA's pure comparative 
negligence provisions, this finding meant that the district court 
reduced Fashauer's damages by 50%.  Unhappy with the 50% 
reduction and the jury's refusal to award damages for lost future 
earnings, Fashauer moved for a new trial.  When that motion was 
denied on July 18, 1994 (in an Opinion and Order filed the next 
day), he timely filed this appeal. 
  
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We will affirm. 
 
 II.  Discussion 
 Most of the questions on this appeal involve the 
district court's denial of Fashauer's jury charge requests.  
Generally, "[t]he standard of review for the district court's 
ruling on points for charge is . . . abuse of discretion."  Link 
v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 922 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  Where, as here, a party contends that the charge as 
given states an incorrect legal standard, "we will review the 
charge as a whole in the light of the evidence to determine if it 
fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury and we 
will reverse if the instructions were capable of confusing and 
thereby misleading the jury."  Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 
457, 462 (3d Cir.) (citing Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers 
Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991) (in banc)), 
cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 186 (1993).  We address 
Fashauer's arguments in turn. 
 
 A.  Assumption of Risk v. Contributory Negligence 
 The most significant question raised on this appeal is 
whether the district court erred by denying Fashauer's request to 
charge the jury that assumption of the risk is not a defense in a 
  
FELA action.  Fashauer timely requested such a charge,2 and 
objected to the district court's charge, which declined to give 
                     
2
.  At oral argument before us, a question was raised about 
whether Fashauer adequately raised the issue before the district 
court.  Fashauer proposed the following points for charge: 
 
 The railroad cannot avoid liability for 
personal injury on the grounds that the 
injured party assumed the risk of his 
employment.  Assumption of risk is not a 
defense in a suit by a railroad worker 
against a railroad, and the railroad worker 
does not assume the risk of being injured 
through the negligence of his employer or the 
negligence of a fellow employee. 
 
 You may not find contributory negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff simply because he 
acceded to the request or direction of a 
supervisor that he work at a dangerous job, 
in a dangerous place, or under unsafe 
conditions. 
 
 The defendant has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence, contributory 
negligence.  The plaintiff does not assume 
the risk of an unsafe place to work and 
cannot be blamed for working in an unsafe 
place. 
 
 It is the duty of a railroad worker to do the 
work assigned.  It is not his duty to find 
the safest method of doing it, or to devise a 
safe[r] method.  Therefore, in considering 
the defendant's claim that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence, the jury 
will bear in mind that the plaintiff is not 
chargeable with any negl[igent] conduct of 
his employer.  The plaintiff is only 
chargeable with his own conduct.  So in 
connection with the defendant's claim of 
contributory negligence, you will consider 
only what the plaintiff himself did, or 
failed to do, at the time and place in 
question as shown by a preponderance of the 
  
it.  Fashauer essentially contends that the district court's 
instructions inadvertently permitted the jury to reduce his 
recovery based on the fact that he continued to perform his job  
despite his knowledge that he was encountering a dangerous 
condition.  He further contends that under the FELA the jury 
should not have been allowed to reduce his recovery because he 
assumed the risk of injury. 
 
 1.  Introduction 
 Congress passed the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 
1906 in part to eliminate barriers common law courts erected to 
protect railroad companies and other common carriers from 
liability for their employees' workplace injuries.  See Tiller v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59, 63 S.Ct. 444, 447 
(1943).  The FELA "substituted comparative negligence for the 
strict rule of contributory negligence," id. at 62, 63 S.Ct. at 
(..continued) 
evidence in the case.  Thus, plaintiff cannot 
be found contributorily negligent based 
solely on his knowledge or acceptance of a 
dangerous situation or based on the fact that 
he was working at a dangerous job.  Rather, 
you may find the plaintiff contributor[ily] 
negligent only if the defendant has proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff did not exercise slight care for 
his own protection. 
 
Quoted in Fashauer's brief at 11-12 n.1.  Although Fashauer's 
proposed instructions do not actually define assumption of the 
risk, we believe they adequately conveyed his view that the jury 
should not have been permitted to reduce his recovery based on 
actions that constitute assumption of the risk. 
  
448-49, but, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, originally 
allowed an employer to interpose assumption of the risk as a 
complete defense to the employer's liability.  See Seaboard Air 
Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 503, 34 S.Ct. 635, 639 (1915).  
The only statutory exception to this occurred "in . . . case[s] 
where the violation by [a] common carrier of [a] statute enacted 
for the safety of employees contributed to the injury of such 
employee."  Id. at 502-03, 34 S.Ct. at 639.  Following widespread 
criticism of its retention of the assumption of risk defense, 
Congress amended the FELA in 1939 to eliminate the defense in 
cases where the injury "resulted in whole or in part from the 
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees" of the 
employer.  45 U.S.C. § 54.  Interpreting the amendments soon 
thereafter, the Supreme Court held that "every vestige of the 
doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by 
the 1939 amendment," see Tiller, 318 U.S. at 57, 63 S.Ct. at 446, 
and that "cases tried under the Federal Act [are] to be handled 
as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever existed."  
Id. at 64, 63 S.Ct. at 450.  The Court warned that "'[u]nless 
great care be taken, the servant's rights will be sacrificed by 
simply charging him with assumption of the risk under another 
name.'" Id. at 58, 63 S.Ct. at 447 (citation omitted). 
 2.  Assuring Assumption of Risk Stays Out  
 In light of the 1939 amendment and Tiller's 
interpretation of it, because contributory negligence on the 
  
plaintiff's part reduces his or her damages, while assumption of 
risk does not, courts have the delicate job of separating out 
evidence on one theory from evidence on the other. See Victor E. 
Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, § 9-4(a)(1) at 202 (3d ed. 
1994) ("[F]acts constituting implied assumption of risk have no 
materiality except as they might also constitute contributory 
negligence.").  Some courts have guarded against jury confusion 
by doing what Fashauer suggests the court should have done here: 
describing assumption of risk to the jury and instructing it not 
to reduce the plaintiff's recovery on that basis.  See Koshorek 
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 318 F.2d 364, 370 (3d Cir. 1963) 
(reversible error for district court not to instruct on 
assumption of risk); Jenkins v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 
206, 212 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).  But other courts have expressed 
wariness about instructing the jury on a legal doctrine not in 
the case.  As one court has put it, "the statutory elimination of 
the defense of assumption of risk, when read to the jury in FELA 
cases where that 'defense' has been neither pleaded nor argued, 
serves only to obscure the issues in the case."  Casko v. Elgin, 
Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co., 361 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 1966).  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on the 
proposition that "'it is a mistake to give instructions on 
subjects not directly in issue in a case,'" DeChico v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 758 F.2d 856, 861 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation 
omitted), has cautioned that "[a]n assumption of risk instruction 
  
may be particularly inappropriate in cases where it 'might well 
cause such confusion as to water down or even eliminate the issue 
of contributory negligence.'" Id. at 861 (quoting Clark v. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 591, 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 1006, 84 S.Ct. 1943 (1964)); see also Clark v. 
Burlington N., Inc., 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Cases 
discussing the issue have generally condemned the giving of an 
assumption of risk instruction in FELA actions."); Heater v. 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir.) (an 
assumption of the risk "instruction is a confusing negative 
statement which refers to issues not involved in a FELA case"), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1013, 95 S.Ct. 333 (1974). 
 These latter cases enunciate a salutary principle:  
Whenever possible, courts should spare juries intricate 
descriptions of opaque legal doctrines inapplicable to the case.  
And indeed, our caselaw, while limited, supports that principle.  
For example, in Seaboldt v Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 290 F.2d 296 
(3d Cir. 1961), the district court at the last minute acceded to 
the plaintiff's request and charged the jury that assumption of 
risk is not a defense.  Id. at 300.  We pointed out that "for 
this difficult concept to be thrown into the jury's mind at the 
last minute without explanation was almost sure to have left it 
in confusion."  Id.  See also De Pascale v. Pennsylvania R.R. 
Co., 180 F.2d 825, 827 (3d Cir. 1950) (district court properly 
refused to instruct on assumption of risk where "[a]ssumption of 
  
risk was definitely not important in th[e] case [when t]here was 
no suggestion regarding it during the course of the trial."). 
 But in the end, this salutary principle can only be a 
starting point.  Because assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence are similar doctrines, and because only the latter is 
a defense under the FELA, we recognize that sometimes the absence 
of an explanation of the differences between the doctrines will 
confuse the jury as to the governing law.  And, following that 
logic, we have held that when the facts of the case present a 
danger of jury confusion on the issue, an assumption of risk 
charge should be given.  Thus, in Koshorek v. Pennsylvania R.R. 
Co., the only evidence concerning the plaintiff's negligence 
consisted of his continuing to work in a dusty shop when he 
"either knew or should have known that inhalation of excessive 
dust over an extended period of time might cause him harm."  318 
F.2d at 369.  The district court refused to give an assumption of 
risk charge and the jury returned a verdict for the railroad.  We 
reversed because "[h]ad an adequate distinction between conduct 
constituting contributory negligence and that which would have 
constituted assumption of risk been pointed to the jurors in the 
charge, the jury might well have reached a different verdict."  
Id. at 369-70. 
 Thus, the most we can say as a matter of law is that 
when the evidence adduced at trial presents a danger that the 
jury might reduce a plaintiff's recovery based on the 
  
impermissible theory of assumption of risk, then the trial judge 
should instruct the jury on how that doctrine differs from 
contributory negligence.  But when the evidence presents no such 
danger, then an adequate charge on contributory and comparative 
negligence suffices.  Of course, the most difficult part of the 
inquiry is determining when the facts merit an assumption of the 
risk instruction.  To answer this question, we must inquire into 
what Congress meant by the phrase "assumption of risk."  Only 
then will we be able to categorize the evidence and determine 
whether such a charge should have been given. 
 
 3.  Assumption of the Risk Generally 
  At common law an employee's voluntary, 
knowledgeable acceptance of a dangerous 
condition that is necessary for him to 
perform his duties constitutes an assumption 
of risk.  Contributory negligence, in 
contrast, is a careless act or omission on 
the plaintiff's part tending to add new 
dangers to conditions that the employer 
negligently created or permitted to exist. 
 
Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir. 
1986) (citations omitted).  Despite this seemingly simple 
definition, courts have a difficult time distinguishing between 
assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.  This 
difficulty is certainly due in large part to the fact that the 
"assumption of risk" concept of voluntarily and knowingly 
accepting a dangerous condition often is used as an umbrella term 
to describe a number of discrete and dissimilar concepts.  See 
  
Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, § 9-1(a) at 187; W. Page 
Keeton, et. al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 68 at 480 (5th 
ed. 1984).  For example, in some cases assumption of risk 
describes a party's express contractual agreement to assume a 
risk; under this scenario, "the defendant is relieved of a legal 
duty to the plaintiff."  Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 68 at 
481.  Other times the phrase is used as a legal fiction under 
which, based on the circumstances, a party is deemed implicitly 
to have consented to bear particular kinds of risk.  For example, 
a railroad worker might be said to have assumed the risks 
inherent in working in a dangerous occupation.  The umbrella 
category of assumptions of risk also divides into the 
subcategories of reasonable assumptions of risk and unreasonable 
assumptions of risk.  See Schwartz, § 9-4(c)(2) at 214; Smith v. 
Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir. 1983).  
Thus, when an expert skier traverses an extremely difficult 
slope, he may be said reasonably to have assumed the risk 
inherent in skiing a difficult slope.  Id. at 1009.  But when a 
novice consciously chooses the difficult slope, his actions 
probably would be characterized as unreasonable.  Thus, a 
person's implicit consent to undertake a risk can be either 
reasonable or unreasonable.  As a corollary, an individual who 
accepts a dangerous employment at a high wage might be said to be 
acting reasonably.  But a person who accepts the identical 
  
employment for a lower wage and with minimal safety precautions 
might be said to be acting unreasonably. 
 The subcategory of unreasonable assumption of risk 
sounds suspiciously like a negligence concept.  In fact, in such 
cases -- where the plaintiff unreasonably assumed a known risk -- 
the difference between assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence appears purely semantic.  Rather than saying the skier 
assumed a risk, we easily could say that he failed to act with 
due care.  See Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 68 at 481 (equating 
unreasonable assumption of risk with contributory negligence).  
The point is crucial, because it means there are times when a 
description of the defense of assumption of the risk "overlaps 
with [a description of] the defense of contributory negligence." 
Smith, 716 F.2d at 1006.  In such cases, evidence supporting one 
theory also constitutes evidence of the other.  Thus, depending 
on how courts characterize such evidence, a jury either may be 
permitted to reduce the plaintiff's recovery or be barred 
completely from considering such evidence.  Thus, our next 
inquiry must be into just what theory of assumption of risk 
Congress sought to prohibit when it barred the defense under the 
FELA.  To answer the question, we turn first to the history 
behind Congress' initial allowing and subsequent elimination of 
the assumption of risk defense under FELA, and then we consider 
the pertinent interpretative caselaw. 
 
  
 4.  Assumption of the Risk Under FELA 
 During the beginnings of industrial growth in the 19th 
century, and prior to the enactment of FELA and other legislation 
protecting employees, the common law governing employment 
injuries "was heavily stacked against employees." Daniel Saphire, 
Two Views on FELA and Railroad Safety, 19 Transp. L. J. 401, 402 
(1991).  Specifically, the common law courts had devised rules 
"to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 
'human overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost -- to 
someone -- of the doing of industrialized business."  Tiller, 318 
U.S. at 59, 63 S.Ct. at 447.  Thus, for example, "a plaintiff's 
contributory negligence barred any subsequent recovery for 
damages, even if the plaintiff was only slightly at fault."  Monk 
v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 1995 WL 231637 at * 2 
(3d Cir. April 20, 1995).  The point, in part, was "to give 
maximum freedom to expanding industry," Tiller, 318 U.S. at 59, 
63 S.Ct. at 447, in the belief that "optimal economic growth 
could occur only when the government did not interfere unduly 
with the free workings of the marketplace."  Jane P. North, 
Comment: Employees' Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice, 
52 Tenn. L. Rev. 35, 39 (1984).  The doctrine of assumption of 
the risk was one of those barriers erected against this 
background.  The doctrine, which "prevented recovery when a 
plaintiff was deemed to have assumed the risk of a known danger," 
Monk, 1995 WL 231637 at * 2 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., 
  
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 68, at 495-96 (5th ed. 
1984)), really was "a judicially created . . . 'rule of public 
policy, [developed because] an opposite doctrine would not only 
subject employers to considerable and often ruinous 
responsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches of business,' 
but would also encourage carelessness on the part of the 
employee."  Tiller, 318 U.S. at 58-59, 63 S.Ct. at 447 (citations 
and footnotes omitted).   
 The Supreme Court summed up the meaning of the concept 
in the pre-FELA case of Tuttle v. Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry. Co., 122 
U.S. 189, 7 S.Ct. 1166 (1887), when it declined to allow a jury 
to inquire into the reasonableness of a railroad's choice of 
machinery.  It explained its decision as follows: 
 The brakemen and others employed to work in 
such situations must decide for themselves 
whether they will encounter the hazards 
incidental thereto; and, if they decide to do 
so, they must be content to assume the risks.  
. . . . 'A railroad yard, where trains are 
made up, necessarily has a great number of 
tracks and switches close to one another, and 
any one who enters the service of a railroad 
company connected with the moving of trains 
assumes the risk of that condition of 
things.'  It is for those who enter into such 
employments to exercise all that care and 
caution which the perils of the business in 
each case demand. 
 
Id. at 194-95, 7 S.Ct. at 1168 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, assumption of risk in the employment context 
described the notion of implied consent -- when an employee takes 
a job, he or she consents to assume the risk of any danger he or 
  
she knows or should know necessarily is entailed in the job.  In 
a sense the doctrine estopped the employee from blaming the 
employer for an injury resulting from a risk contemplated by the 
parties when they fashioned their employment contract.  The Court 
in fact explicitly relied on this quasi-contract basis for the 
doctrine: "'[T]he servant, when he engages in the employment, 
does so in view of all the incidental hazards, and . . . he and 
his employer, when making their negotiations, -- fixing the terms 
and agreeing upon the compensation that shall be paid to him, -- 
must have contemplated these as having an important bearing upon 
their stipulations.  As the servant then knows that he will be 
exposed to the incidental risk, he must be supposed to have 
contracted that, as between himself and the master, he would run 
this risk.'"  Id. at 195-96, 7 S.Ct. at 1168-69 (citation 
omitted).  Therefore in an action claiming damages because of 
one's employer's negligence, "although an employer may have 
violated the duty of care which he owed his employee, he could 
nevertheless escape liability for damages resulting from his 
negligence if the employee, by accepting or continuing in the 
employment with 'notice' of such negligence, 'assumed the risk.'"  
Tiller, 318 U.S. at 69, 63 S.Ct. at 452 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).   
 In a case decided after the original FELA was enacted -
- when assumption of the risk remained a complete defense to the 
railroad's negligence -- the Supreme Court distinguished 
  
assumption of the risk from contributory negligence and again 
described assumption of risk in implied consent terms.  
"Contributory negligence involves the notion of some fault or 
breach of duty on the part of the employee."  Seaboard Air Line 
Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. at 503, 34 S.Ct. at 639-40.  Assumption 
of the risk, on the other hand, "may be free from any suggestion 
of fault or negligence on the part of the employee."  Rather, 
"employments [that] are necessarily fraught with danger to the 
workman . . . are normally and necessarily incident to the 
occupation [and] are presumably taken into account in fixing the 
rate of wages."  Id. at 504, 34 S.Ct. at 640.  Assumption of the 
risk again referred to risks to which the plaintiff implicitly 
consented in taking the employment; other than that, the 
plaintiff was charged with acting as a prudent person under the 
circumstances. 
 Tiller, the seminal case that first interpreted the 
1939 FELA amendment, canvassed the history of the assumption of 
the risk defense, and explained it in implied consent terms.  The 
Court noted that assumption of the risk originally was included 
in the FELA "because of acceptance of the theory that the 
employee's compensation was based upon the added risk to his 
position and that he could quit when he pleased."  Tiller, 318 
U.S. at 61, 63 S.Ct. at 448.  But, the Court noted, in adopting 
the amendments, "[t]he report of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
struck at the basic reasons advanced by common law courts for the 
  
existence of the doctrine, declared it unsuited to present day 
activities, and described them as out of harmony with the 
equitable principles which should govern determinations of 
employer-employee responsibilities."  Id. at 64-65, 63 S.Ct. at 
450 (citing Senate report).   
 Thus, Supreme Court cases from the pre-FELA, pre-
amendment and post-amendment eras all contemplated that 
assumption of risk under the FELA referred to the employee's 
implied consent to assume the risks entailed in employment.  So 
Congress in adopting the 1939 amendments sought to prevent juries 
from reducing a plaintiff's recovery because the plaintiff 
performed a dangerous task or a dangerous job rather than quit or 
find employment elsewhere. 
 
 5.  Refining the distinctions 
 Various courts have refined the distinction between 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence under the FELA in 
the last few decades.  In the oft-cited Taylor v. Burlington N. 
R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, a case in which the plaintiff claimed 
injuries resulting from harassment by his supervisor, the 
railroad argued that the plaintiff's failure to "bid off" to 
another work area where he would work under a different 
supervisor, constituted contributory negligence.  The court 
disagreed, holding that "[t]he employee who enters the workplace 
for a routine assignment in compliance with the orders and 
  
directions of his employer or its supervising agents, who by such 
entry incurs risks not extraordinary in scope, is not 
contributorily negligent, but rather is engaging in an assumption 
of risk."  Id. at 1316.  Assumption of risk as the court 
described it thus was comprised of the plaintiff's implicit 
consent to the risks of employment; the employer could not reduce 
its liability by arguing that the plaintiff should not have 
performed the job. 
 In Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822, 94 S.Ct. 122 (1973),3 the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also applied the implied 
consent theory of assumption of risk.  In that case, the 
plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet pantry floor while performing 
his job of getting ice cream for a crew member.  The district 
court charged the jury that "appellant might have been 
contributorily negligent by not having 'the common sense to go 
and say to somebody in charge, "Look, this has got to be cleaned 
up; I won't work here until it is done."'"  Id. at 258 (quoting 
charge).  The court of appeals, noting that "unrebutted evidence 
. . . established that . . . numerous complaints about the 
situation in the pantry had been made to no avail," reasoned that 
                     
3
.  Rivera arose under the Jones Act, but the standards governing 
the parties' conduct generally are the same under both the FELA 
and the Jones Act.  Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 
426, 439, 78 S.Ct. 394, 401 (1958) (Seaman "was in a position 
perfectly analogous to that of the railroad workers . . . and the 
principles governing [FELA] cases clearly should apply [under the 
Jones Act]."). 
  
"[i]t cannot be known whether further complaint by appellant 
would have resulted in correction of the drain defect in time to 
avoid the accident."  Id.  Thus, "if . . . contributory 
negligence is submitted to the jury on retrial . . . it should be 
done so only with a caveat that the appellant was not duty bound 
to perform a futile act."  Id.  In other words, if the employee 
could not reasonably expect the employer to correct the defect, 
then the employee had no real alternative but to perform the 
task, defect or not.  But if reasonable safe alternatives were 
available -- such as if notification could have resulted in 
immediate correction of the problem, then it was not necessary 
for the employee to accept the dangerous condition.  The employee 
could not be said to have implicitly consented to working in an 
unsafe work area, and his actions in failing to follow a safer 
alternative would constitute contributory negligence.  Thus, when 
alternatives besides quitting are available to plaintiff, his 
actions are reviewed for reasonableness, and unreasonable 
assumptions of risk constitute evidence of contributory 
negligence.  See also Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 
676, 683 (10th Cir. 1981) (adopting implied consent theory of 
assumption of the risk) (person is not guilty of contributory 
negligence "'simply because he acceded to the request or 
direction of the responsible representatives of his employer that 
he work at a dangerous job, or in a dangerous place, or under 
  
unsafe conditions.'") (quoting Devitt and Blackmar, Fed. Jury 
Prac. and Instructions, §94.16 (3d ed.)). 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
applied these principles to the day to day relationships between 
supervisor and employee in Jenkins v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 22 
F.3d 206 (9th Cir. 1994).  In that case, a railroad engineer was 
attempting to "shove a length of nine flatcars to a point where 
they would be coupled with other cars."  Id. at 208.  Because the 
engineer's locomotive was pushing (rather than pulling) the cars, 
the engineer was unable to observe the point of contact, and the 
plaintiff was asked to act as his eyes and ears.  The plaintiff 
did this by boarding the front car.  Because the engineer 
believed that the plaintiff was having difficulty boarding the 
car, he stepped on the brakes.  But the other cars continued to 
move forward, and the plaintiff was "caught on the axle, pulled 
under the train, and thrown out onto the rail," suffering severe 
injuries.  Id. at 209. 
 In making its analysis, the court distinguished between 
general orders and specific orders.  "'Where a general order is 
given, an employee must use ordinary care in its execution, and 
the giving of the order does not affect the question whether the 
servant has been negligent in his manner of carrying it out, 
where there is a choice open to him.'"  Id. at 211 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added).  In such cases, the plaintiff's 
actions are reviewable for contributory negligence.  However, 
  
when the employee is given a specific order -- that is, where he 
or she is told to perform a specific task in a particular way -- 
"he is not contributorily negligent; rather his conduct falls 
under the abolished doctrine of assumption of risk."  Id.  In 
other words, when a plaintiff has no real choice, his recovery 
should not be reduced because he performed the task, regardless 
of whether the plaintiff acted reasonably or unreasonably.  But 
when the plaintiff has reasonable alternatives available to him, 
he must act reasonably in performing his job.  And if he acts 
unreasonably, he is answerable for contributory negligence.   
 To illustrate, in that case, the employer produced 
evidence that the plaintiff violated company safety rules in 
performing the job in the manner in which he did.  Because this 
evidence supported the employer's argument that the plaintiff had 
a safer method of performing his job, the court "agree[d] with 
Union Pacific that the jury could rationally find that Jenkins 
contributed to his own injury by violating the operating rule."  
Id. at 212. 
 Not all courts agree with the proposition that 
assumption of risk under the FELA describes the theory that the 
plaintiff implicitly has consented to the risks of his 
employment, and that when there are alternatives available the 
plaintiff must act reasonably.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, for example, took a more expansive view in 
Birchem v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 812 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1987).  
  
There, the plaintiff used a defective "mudjack" despite knowing 
of company safety rules "forbidding the use of unsafe or 
defective equipment."  Id. at 1048-49.  In the court's view, the 
district court properly rejected the railroad's proffered 
instruction that the plaintiff's conduct evidenced negligence on 
his part.  Rather, according to the court, "[t]he district court 
properly admonished the jury during the trial that the Railroad's 
theory was an impermissible effort to transfer to Birchem its 
nondelegable duty to provide safe equipment and a safe working 
environment."  Id. at 1049.  In so holding, the court necessarily 
rejected the proposition that unreasonable assumptions of the 
risk entailed in choosing one particular method of performing a 
task may constitute contributory negligence.  It thus rejected 
implied consent as the theory of assumption of risk under FELA.4 
 We are not persuaded by the Birchem court's analysis.  
In our view, the history behind the FELA and the Supreme Court's 
pronouncements in pre- and post-FELA cases makes clear that 
assumption of risk in the employment context refers to implied 
consent.  Taylor, Jenkins, and Rivera are in accord with that 
principle and we find their analyses persuasive.  Thus, we hold 
the following:  A plaintiff's recovery under the FELA never can 
                     
4
.  Despite that language in the court's opinion, though, it 
approved, without elaborating, the district court's instruction 
that "evidence concerning the manner and way in which [plaintiff] 
used the equipment was proper for its consideration."  Birchem, 
812 F.2d at 1049.  It is difficult to see how a jury would 
reconcile these instructions. 
  
be reduced on the basis that he or she implicitly consented to 
the risk by accepting employment with the railroad or by 
performing a task in the manner which the employer directed.  
This is true regardless of whether the plaintiff acted reasonably 
or unreasonably.  Thus, even when a jury examining a plaintiff's 
position objectively would conclude that he acted unreasonably in 
accepting employment, or performing a task at all, such 
unreasonable actions for FELA purposes are characterized as 
assumption of risk rather than contributory negligence.   
 But all other actions of plaintiff are "to be handled 
as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever existed," 
Tiller, 318 U.S. at 64, 63 S.Ct. at 450, and if they are evidence 
of negligence they should be admitted to show contributory 
negligence.  Thus, when reasonable alternatives besides quitting 
or refusing to perform the task in an unsafe way are available, a 
plaintiff is charged with acting with due care and will be held 
responsible for acting unreasonably.  In such circumstances 
"[w]hen the plaintiff unreasonably assumes a known risk, his 
fault in that regard is negligence and his damage award may be 
subject to apportionment."  See Schwartz at § 9-4(c)(2) at 214; 
see also id. at § 9-4(a)(1) at 202 ("The language of the F.E.L.A. 
makes it clear that . . . only facts that would constitute 
unreasonable implied assumption of risk (as contrasted with 
reasonable) can serve to reduce the plaintiff's award.").  
Examples of evidence of contributory negligence include failing 
  
to follow specific safety instructions reasonably calculated to 
protect the employee from the injury that occurred; failing to 
report a defect when the evidence establishes that such reporting 
would be productive; and failing to act prudently in performing 
the task. 
 Based on these principles, if no evidence of 
impermissible assumption of risk has reached the jury, a correct 
instruction on contributory negligence will do.  However, if, 
either because of evidence introduced at trial or because of 
statements made by counsel in opening or closing arguments, there 
is a risk that the implied consent theory of assumption of the 
risk seeped its way into the case, the jury should be instructed 
that it "may not find contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff . . . simply because he acceded to the request or 
direction of the responsible representatives of his employer that 
he work at a dangerous job, or in a dangerous place, or under 
unsafe conditions."  Joyce, 651 F.2d at 683 (citation omitted). 
 We now turn to the facts of this case to determine 
whether there was a danger that the jury confused assumption of 
the risk with contributory negligence, and therefore that an 
assumption of risk charge should have been given. 
 
 6.  Application Of the Law 
 Fashauer claims that defense counsel made a number of 
impermissible references in her opening and closing statements, 
  
the net result of which enabled the jury to reduce his recovery 
based on an impermissible version of assumption of the risk.  He 
first argues that defense counsel's statement in her opening that 
"plaintiff is not a newcomer to the railroad," see app. 168, 
demonstrates an illicit attempt to bring assumption of risk into 
the case.  He buttresses the point by quoting counsel's argument 
that "[plaintiff] walked in that vestibule back and forth during 
the course of that day through the very spot that he later 
alleges he slipped in."  app. 169. 
 When counsel's statements are read amidst the 
surrounding context, however, it becomes clear that she was not 
interjecting assumption of risk into the case but instead 
attempting to show that:  (1) the vestibule's condition was the 
result not of New Jersey Transit's negligence but of normal 
conditions during the rain; and (2) Fashauer did not act with due 
care in walking through the wet vestibule.  For instance, she 
argued that "if you add up the total number of stops at the time 
this alleged incident happened, [the accident happened on] the 
19th stop.  As you know on the stops passengers get on and off 
the train and it has been continuing to rain the entire day."  
App. 169.   Moreover, the references to Fashauer going in and out 
of the vestibule were intended to point out that despite his 
complaint about the soaked vestibule, "plaintiff never reported 
any leaking from the tube diaphragm into the vestibule area at 
any time before this accident happened."  Id.  That observation 
  
was a legitimate attempt to rebut Fashauer's argument that the 
vestibule was unusually wet that day.  Further, defense counsel's 
emphasis on the fact that Fashauer "wasn't holding on to any 
handholds whatsoever," in violation of company safety rules, see 
id. at 170, was a permissible argument advancing the defense of 
contributory negligence.  If the jury believed the evidence, it 
could have found that Fashauer had a safer alternative to the 
manner in which he performed his task. 
 Next, Fashauer points to defense counsel's argument in 
her closing that: 
 [i]t's common sense that plaintiff should 
have been expected to know that this floor 
was wet.  Again I'm going to stress this, 
probably until you're sick of hearing that we 
know it was raining all day long.  He had 
been out there for seven hours, at least.  
Windy, hurricane, rainy day, stormy.  I mean 
passengers coming.  You know there was two 
hundred passengers, the floor has to be wet.  
Plaintiff had to have known the floor was wet 
and that the rug was wet.  He had to know the 
exact condition of the floor. 
 
app. 892.  But defense counsel did not use these observations to 
build an argument that Fashauer should not have performed his 
job.  Rather, she argued that he acted unreasonably in performing 
the task in the manner in which he did, and that the condition 
Fashauer encountered was not abnormal and therefore not 
proximately caused by New Jersey Transit's negligence.  After 
making the above-quoted statements, defense counsel segued into a 
discussion of the relevant safety rules, and argued that when 
Fashauer failed to follow them he contributed to the injury.  See 
  
app. 892-93.  To say that such an argument should not have been 
made would be "to water down or even eliminate the issue of 
contributory negligence."  DeChico v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 
758 F.2d at 861.  Indeed, if we precluded the argument we 
virtually would be preventing the jury from considering whether 
there were in fact reasonable safe alternatives for Fashauer to 
follow.  Id.; see also Jenkins, 22 F.3d at 212 (violating 
operating rule constitutes evidence of contributory negligence). 
 More problematic is the district court's description of 
the evidence in the case during its charge.  The court instructed 
the jury that "defendant . . . alleges that plaintiff contributed 
to the happening of the accident by his own negligence in moving 
about the vestibule and by failing to follow safety regulations."  
App. 956.  The first part of the court's statement could be read 
to imply that Fashauer was contributorily negligent simply 
because he moved about the vestibule in the rain.  If the 
statement had gone unqualified, we might be inclined to agree 
with Fashauer that the charge permitted the jury to reduce his 
recovery based simply on the fact that he performed his job.  But 
the court did not issue its statement in a vacuum as it made the 
statement only after thoroughly describing the concepts of 
negligence and ordinary prudence.  Thus, the court was referring 
to the manner in which Fashauer walked through the vestibule, 
rather than to the simple fact that he walked through the 
vestibule.  Moreover, we have found nothing in the record 
  
constituting an impermissible argument on assumption of risk as 
we have defined it.  As in Seaboldt and De Pascale, "[t]here was 
no suggestion regarding [assumption of risk] during the course of 
the trial."  De Pascale, 180 F.2d at 827.  It therefore is 
inconceivable to us that the jury would sua sponte have taken it 
upon itself to manufacture an additional defense.   
 To summarize, we do not believe that the charge as a 
whole was confusing to the jury on this point.  We therefore 
reject Fashauer's argument that the district court erred by 
failing to instruct the jury that assumption of risk is not a 
defense under the FELA. 
 
 B.  Charge on Contributory Negligence 
 Fashauer next contends that the district court gave a 
defective charge on the standard for contributory negligence.  As 
indicated above, the question on review is whether the charge, 
taken as a whole, correctly stated the applicable law.  Here, the 
question really is one of law -- defining the concept of 
contributory negligence.  The district court instructed the jury 
as follows: 
 To determine whether the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent, you apply the same 
definition of negligence discussed earlier.  
That is did the plaintiff take or fail to 
take actions which a reasonably prudent 
person would have taken in the circumstances.  
You also apply the same rule of causation.  
That is did plaintiff's negligence, if any, 
play any part in bringing about his injuries.  
Although I have instructed you that plaintiff 
has the burden of proving its case by a 
  
preponderance of the evidence, it is the 
defendant which has the burden of proving 
also by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
 
App. 960-61 (emphasis added).  The court previously defined 
negligence as follows: 
 Negligence is simply the failure to use the 
same degree of care which a person of 
ordinary prudence would use in the 
circumstances of a given situation.  It could 
be the doing of something which a reasonably 
prudent person would not have done, or 
failing to do something which a reasonably 
prudent person would have done under the 
circumstances.  The definition of negligence 
requires the defendant to guard against those 
risks or dangers of which it knew or by the 
exercise of due care should have known. 
 
App. 957. 
 Fashauer contends that the court erred in "impos[ing] a 
standard of causation in dealing with the issue of plaintiff's 
contributory negligence that is significantly more harsh than the 
standard that would be applied under the common law."  Br. at 23.  
Fashauer also appears to take issue with the court's duty of care 
instruction; he contends that under the FELA he has only a slight 
duty to protect himself, and thus the court erred in holding him 
to the same standard of care as the railroad.  The district 
court, in its opinion ruling on Fashauer's motion for a new 
trial, followed the language of the statute, a Pennsylvania 
district court case, and a case from the Sixth Circuit to hold 
that the same causation and care standards apply to both employer 
and employee.  It noted, though, that "I personally find it very 
  
problematic that in a remedial statute designed to protect the 
working man and working woman, that you should apply, in effect, 
an enhanced contributorily negligent [sic] statute, because 
that's the effect.  You're putting a heavier burden on the worker 
than even the common-law would have put on it."  Op. at 68. 
 In the first place, we are puzzled by Fashauer's 
contention and the district court's concern regarding the 
causation instruction.  It must be remembered that under the pre-
FELA common law, contributory negligence totally barred a 
plaintiff from any recovery.  Thus, in that scenario, the 
proposition that a plaintiff is contributorily negligent if his 
negligence played any part at all in causing the injury at times 
would have worked draconian consequences.  But the FELA modified 
the common law; it contains a comparative negligence scheme which 
reduces plaintiff's recovery only in proportion to his share of 
responsibility for the injury.  In short, while the standards of 
causation differ, so do the results of a finding of contributory 
negligence.  As the district court instructed the jury: 
"[A]ssuming that you find . . . that plaintiff was negligent and 
that his negligence played a part in causing his own injuries, 
you must then determine the percentage to which plaintiff's 
negligence, if any, contributed to his injuries."  App. 961.  
Thus, a jury finding of contributory negligence does no harm to 
the plaintiff unless it makes a further finding that the 
plaintiff's fault contributed to the injury to a particular 
  
degree.  In other words, if a plaintiff's negligence contributed 
only marginally to the injury, his recovery would be reduced only 
marginally.  Since the jury found that Fashauer was 50% 
responsible for his injury, it obviously found that he was more 
than marginally responsible.  Therefore, in a pure comparative 
negligence scheme such as FELA's, Fashauer's argument is 
insubstantial.   
 We also disagree with Fashauer's contention that a FELA 
plaintiff is held to a lesser standard of care than his employer, 
notwithstanding the district court's invitation to us to reverse 
on this ground.  See op. at 68-69 ("I welcome the insight, 
guidance, and even reversal from the Third Circuit on this 
issue.").  In the first place, it is unclear what it means to say 
that a plaintiff has only a slight duty to protect himself.  It 
seems to us that someone acts either with due care or without due 
care.  The FELA is neither a worker's compensation statute nor a 
strict liability statute, and absent explicit direction from 
Congress or the Supreme Court, we decline to turn it into one. 
 More importantly, our interpretation is confirmed by 
the language of the statute.  By its very terms, the FELA 
provides that "the damages shall be diminished by the jury in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such 
employee."  45 U.S.C. § 53.  The statute does not distinguish 
between degrees of negligence; the statute does not say that the 
plaintiff only has a slight duty of care.  Under the statute, a 
  
plaintiff's recovery is reduced to the extent that he is 
negligent and that such negligence is responsible for the injury.  
In such a situation, one must assume that Congress intended its 
words to mean what they ordinarily are taken to mean -- a person 
is negligent if he or she fails to act as an ordinarily prudent 
person would act in similar circumstances.  Such a reading also 
is in accord with the FELA's pure comparative negligence scheme; 
and to adopt Fashauer's argument would be to abandon the clear 
dictate of the statute in favor of a policy decision to favor 
employees over employers. 
 Our interpretation finds further support in precedents 
of this court and others.  In the Jones Act case of Mroz v. Dravo 
Corp., 429 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1970), the appellant contended that 
the district court erred by charging the jury on contributory 
negligence.  In rejecting the argument, we reasoned: 
 [C]ontributory negligence is the neglect of 
the duty imposed upon a person to exercise 
ordinary care for his own protection and 
safety which is a legally contributing cause 
of an injury.  In determining whether an 
injured person has been guilty of 
contributory negligence the standard of 
conduct to which he must conform is that of a 
reasonably prudent person under the 
circumstances.  If a person by his own action 
subjects himself unnecessarily to danger 
which should have been anticipated and is 
injured thereby he is guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
 
Id. at 1163.  Fashauer's argument that different duties of care 
apply is directly contrary to this language, which applies the 
  
same standard of care to both employer and employee.  Other 
courts similarly have ruled.  See Karvelis v. Constellation Lines 
S.A., 806 F.2d 49, 52-53 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1986) (approving jury 
instruction charging that both plaintiff and defendant are 
required to act with reasonable care), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891 (1987); Brown v. OMI Corp., 863 F. Supp. 
169, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying reasonable care standard to 
defendant's contributory negligence claims). 
 To be sure, Fashauer's contention derives support from 
a series of Jones Act cases decided in the Fifth Circuit.  Under 
the standard enunciated in those cases, "a seaman's duty to 
protect himself is not ordinary care, but slight care."  Brooks 
v. Great Lakes Dredge-Dock Co., 754 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(citing cases), modified on other grounds, 754 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 
1985). In Brooks, for example, the court of appeals found 
reversible error in an instruction that "contributory negligence 
is the failure on the part of the injured party to use ordinary 
care for his own safety under the circumstances at the time and 
place in question."  Id. (emphasis added); see also Bobb v. 
Modern Prods., Inc., 648 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1981).  But we 
find those cases unpersuasive in light of the FELA's explicit 
language and comparative negligence scheme, and further note that 
it is unclear whether the slight care standard is viable in the 
Fifth Circuit itself.  In a more recent discussion of the 
question, that court of appeals said in rather explicit terms 
  
that "the same general negligence ('ordinary prudence') and 
causation standards apply to both employer and employee in 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (and, by extension, Jones Act) 
cases."  Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1019 n.7 (5th 
Cir. 1992). 
 We find no error in the district court's contributory 
negligence charge. 
 
 C.  Future lost earnings capacity 
 Fashauer next argues that the district court erred in 
its jury instruction on future lost earnings.  It is settled law 
that in a FELA case, a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages 
for lost earning capacity.  Wiles v. New York, Chicago and St. 
Louis R.R. Co., 283 F.2d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 900, 81 S.Ct. 232 (1960); Gorniak v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 889 F.2d 481, 483 (3d Cir. 1989); see also 
McNight v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 1270 (1993).  
Under that theory of damages, if a plaintiff "show[s] that his 
injury has caused a diminution in his ability to earn a living," 
he or she may recover damages covering the extent to which the 
railroad's negligence caused the diminution in earning capacity.  
However, such recovery is appropriate only where the plaintiff 
"has produced competent evidence suggesting that his injuries 
  
have narrowed the range of economic opportunities available to 
him."  Gorniak, 889 F.2d at 484.   
 In Gorniak, we discussed what such evidence must 
entail, and, after canvassing the relevant caselaw, concluded 
that a plaintiff may prove impaired earning capacity by 
presenting evidence of "a decreased ability to weather adverse 
economic circumstances, such as a discharge or lay-off, or [a 
decreased ability] to voluntarily leave the defendant employer 
for other employment."  Id.  In Wiles, for example, the 
plaintiff, as a result of the defendant's negligence, had 
undergone numerous operations and wound up with substantial and 
ineradicable scars in his back, and a permanent minor back 
deformity.  While he remained employed by the railroad as a car 
repairman, his medical expert testified that "he would have 
difficulty getting a job in heavy industry elsewhere than with 
the Railroad" because physical examinations, generally required 
by such employers, "would compel Wiles to disclose the nature of 
his operations and that he had a history of disc protrusion and 
back fusion and these disclosures would militate against his 
securing employment."  Wiles, 283 F.2d at 331.  Based on this 
testimony, we held that, although Wiles was earning more in his 
current position than in his position at the time of his injury, 
he had no protection against being discharged or laid off.  And 
if one of those contingencies occurred, he would face the 
consequences of a reduced ability to procure employment.  Id. at 
  
332.  Additionally, "if [Wiles] cannot obtain gainful employment 
elsewhere he is chained to his present job in a kind of economic 
servitude."  Id.  In such circumstances, Wiles had shown evidence 
that his injuries limited his economic horizons. 
 The evidence in Gorniak was even stronger.  At the time 
of the injury, Amtrak employed the plaintiff as a materials 
handler.  At trial, the plaintiff introduced expert evidence that 
he "was subject to permanent physical restrictions . . . that 
would preclude him from working as a materials handler or store 
attendant in an Amtrak warehouse, and in many positions in the 
industrial workforce outside Amtrak."  Gorniak, 889 F.2d at 484.  
Moreover, although after the injury Amtrak had given the 
plaintiff a position as a ticket clerk, he introduced evidence 
that because of the company's seniority system, if Amtrak cut 
down on its light duty force, he would be without a job.  In 
support of this fear, "evidence at trial indicate[d] that Amtrak 
has closed one if its Pennsylvania facilities and has abolished 
jobs in plaintiff's craft at another during Gorniak's employment 
with Amtrak."  Id. at 484.  Finally, we noted that "Gorniak . . . 
is under no obligation to remain with Amtrak, and the fact that 
his injuries hindered his ability to obtain other employment if 
he wished was one the jury could consider in deciding to award 
him damages."  Id. 
 Although we reject New Jersey Transit's argument that 
evidence supporting lost earnings capacity must come from a 
  
vocational expert, we nevertheless agree that Fashauer has  
produced no "competence evidence" supporting his claim for these 
damages.  The evidence consisted almost entirely of medical 
testimony, only tangentially related to Fashauer's economic 
horizons, that the accident caused a permanent injury to his 
shoulder that restricted his physical activity.  See app. 444 
(testimony of Dr. Gary Goldstein).  For instance, Dr. Goldstein 
testified that because of the injury, Fashauer cannot lift 
weights over 20 pounds above his waist level and therefore "can't 
do any activities that would involve reaching overhead with even 
minimal power."  Id.  Thus, Fashauer was unable to continue 
working as a trainman or brakeman.  Id. at 445.  Fashauer himself 
testified that his inability to lift his arm very high prevented 
him from performing his prior work at the railroad.  App. 221.   
 But Fashauer does not refer to testimony that he would 
have difficulty obtaining work with a different employer, or that 
jobs he could do after the injury were less lucrative than his 
railroad job.  No witness even opined that Fashauer's injury 
limited his economic potential.  On appeal, Fashauer points to 
nothing specific in the record which would constitute evidence 
from which a jury could calculate such damages.  The jury had no 
information from which to conclude that Fashauer's economic 
horizons were limited.  He essentially wanted the jury to take 
his counsel's word for it. 
  
 At any rate, contrary to Fashauer's argument, the 
district court's charge, read in its entirety, adequately 
instructed the jury on loss of future earning capacity.  Fashauer 
points to various portions of the district court's charge that he 
contends permitted the jury to award future damages only for the 
time he was unable to work at all.  But the charge is not so 
limited.  For instance, the court said to the jury: 
 [Y]ou next have to fix the amount of the 
loss.  You do this by considering the length 
of time during which plaintiff was not able 
to work.  The length of time he'll be unable 
to work in the future.  What his income was 
before the injuries and the extent that any 
physical impairments resulting from injuries 
may lessen or decrease his income, should he 
return to the work force. 
 
App. 963 (court's jury charge) (emphasis added).  While the court 
first referred to damages while Fashauer was unable to work, it 
then plainly instructed the jury to consider whether Fashauer's 
income would decrease if he does return to work.  It appears that 
the judge categorized damages based on inability to work and 
damages based on a decreased earning capacity as separate 
measures of damages.  The court continued: 
 If you decide . . . that it is reasonable 
that plaintiff will lose income in the future 
because he has not been able to return to 
work, then you should also include an amount 
to make up for those lost wages.  In deciding 
how much your verdict should be to cover 
future lost income, think about the factors 
mentioned in discussing past earning losses, 
such as the nature, extent and duration of 
his injury.  Also consider the plaintiff's 
age today, his general state of health before 
the accident, how long you reasonably expect 
  
the loss of income to continue and how much 
plaintiff can earn in any available job that 
he . . . physically will be able to do. 
 
App. 964-65.  Here again, it is clear that the court separated 
the two measures of damages -- damages based on an inability to 
work and damages based on impaired earning capacity in the 
future.  But it certainly did not say that the former is the 
exclusive measure of future lost income damages.  In discussing 
the law regarding awards of fringe benefits, the court 
instructed: 
 [Fringe benefits are] benefit[s] that you 
should include in your award for each future 
year, if any, in which you find plaintiff 
will likely be unable to return to work. . . 
.  If you find that at some point in time 
plaintiff should be able to return to work, 
but at a lower paying position[,] in fixing 
the amount of the future wage loss, you 
should consider not only the difference in 
pay rates, but the possible lower value of 
any fringe benefits available to plaintiff in 
his new position. 
 
App. 966.  Again, the "confusion" Fashauer perceives in the 
charge derives from the court's decision to distinguish the two 
measures of damages.  It is difficult to see how a jury could be 
confused by an instruction which repeatedly asks it to consider 
loss of earning capacity.  We reject Fashauer's argument. 
 
 D.  Rebuttal Witness 
 Fashauer next contends that the district court erred in 
refusing to permit him to call a rebuttal witness who was not 
  
listed in the pretrial orders.  His contention builds upon the 
following procedural background. 
 In the pretrial order, New Jersey Transit named Dr. 
Morris Ehrenreich as a vocational expert.  Ehrenreich was slated 
to testify that based on doctors' reports about Fashauer's work 
abilities and a job search conducted in the New Jersey area, 
Fashauer had numerous employment opportunities.  Nothing in the 
pretrial summary of testimony indicated that Ehrenreich had 
conducted a job search by answering classified advertisements in 
newspapers.  At trial, however, when defense counsel asked 
Ehrenreich about the methods he used to gauge Fashauer's ability 
to gain employment, the following colloquy ensued: 
 Q:   And what did you do? 
 A: I did a laborer survey, a laborer 
survey, which looked at the jobs available to 
him in this community, and, in fact, I found 
him a -- employer who's ready to interview 
him for a job if he wishes. 
 
 Q: And what job is that? 
 
 A: This was a job as a salesman for a car 
dealership.  I spoke to the manager who 
suggested that Mr. -- that if he's interested 
in the job, he can come down and apply for 
the job and indicated that the average 
salesman for this dealership earns between 30 
and $70,000 a year. 
 
App. 778-79. 
 Subsequent questioning by the court revealed that 
Ehrenreich had discovered this "job opportunity" by responding to 
newspaper advertisements in the Asbury Park Press the day before 
  
he testified.  Moreover, the court's further questioning revealed 
that while the trial was proceeding, New Jersey Transit's counsel 
had supplied Ehrenreich with the newspapers, thereby assisting 
Ehrenreich in the untimely job search.5  In other words, as the 
court later put it, Ehrenreich, with New Jersey Transit's 
cooperation, amended his report during the trial without notice 
to Fashauer's counsel. 
                     
5
.  The court questioned the witness as follows: 
 
 THE COURT:  What made you call up [the Jaguar 
company]? 
 
 THE WITNESS:  They had an ad in the paper 
offering jobs with training. 
 
 THE COURT: Well, there's hundreds of ads 
in the paper every day. . . . What made you 
pick that one? 
 
 THE WITNESS: Well, I got the job from 
Friday from the Asbury News. 
 
 THE COURT: From when? 
 
 THE WITNESS: This past Friday. 
 
 THE COURT: So, this was just done this 
Friday? 
 
 THE WITNESS: Yes.  And it was a -- many of 
the jobs require that you -- that you fax 
them a resume or you send a resume in. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
 THE COURT: And this you did last Friday? 
 
 THE WITNESS: This I did on Monday. 
 
App. 780-82. 
  
 Immediately upon discovering that the witness had 
testified about a survey not mentioned in the pretrial report, 
the court practically invited Fashauer to object to the 
testimony.  Nonetheless, his counsel explicitly declined to 
object, informing the court that "I'm not objecting."  App. 782.6  
Subsequently, out of the presence of the jury, the court severely 
rebuked New Jersey Transit and the expert: 
 THE COURT:  I think harm has been done to 
slip by the notion that to have this witness, 
in effect, work on his report, because that's 
what he's doing when he's making the calls.  
He's working on his report.  He's modifying 
his report when he gets up there and says 
there is a car dealership that would 
interview this man.  He's modifying his 
report. 
 
                     
6
.  The relevant passage was as follows: 
 
 Q: Did you make any other calls previously 
to them? 
 
 A: Not really. 
  
 THE COURT: Do you have something to say? 
 
 MR. BARISH: No. 
 
 THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
 
 MR. BARISH: I started to. 
 
 THE COURT: Either you object or you don't object.  
Your motions don't mean --  
 
 MR. BARISH: I'm not objecting. 
 
 THE COURT: Okay.  Ask your next question. 
 
App. 782. 
  
  I might add he didn't say till I 
questioned him when that was done.  Only in 
response to my questions did it come out he 
did it yesterday.  It is yesterday, really 
yesterday, not just -- I'm shocked and 
stunned that a witness would be put on the 
stand. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
  [I]t's another example of [sic] this 
case of, in effect, trial by ambush, and the 
idea is to say -- I don't have to repeat that 
I don't like it. 
 
App. 798.  Instead of objecting to the testimony or requesting 
the court to give a limiting instruction, Fashauer's counsel 
elected to cross-examine Ehrenreich about the substance of his 
telephone call to the dealership salesman. 
 After Ehrenreich finished testifying -- and after the 
court again rebuked New Jersey Transit -- Fashauer's counsel 
requested leave to present a rebuttal witness, who was to testify 
that "he conducted a job search through the agencies, through a 
number of sources of his business, through the State of New 
Jersey, and that there were no jobs . . . presently available 
that Mr. Fashauer could receive."  App. 859.  The district court 
denied the motion, reasoning that "I think [Dr. Ehrenreich's] 
testimony was so ludicrous that it's just inconceivable to me 
that the jury got anything out of it."  App. 861.  Thus, "I'm 
making the judgment that [Dr. Ehrenreich's testimony] is so 
laughably ludicrous that I don't think you need -- that it 
requires rebuttal."  App. 861-62. 
  
 In its ruling on Fashauer's post-trial motions, the 
district court amplified the reasons behind its decision to 
preclude the rebuttal testimony.  In that opinion, the court 
questioned Fashauer's counsel's motive in requesting leave to 
call a rebuttal witness.  Noting that his rebuttal witness 
"apparently was in court ready to go" when Ehrenreich gave his 
surprise testimony, see op. at 76, the court pointed out that 
"[t]here's absolutely nothing [the witness] could have said about 
that. . . . He couldn't say, I called the same Jaguar salesman, 
and he said No, there is no job."  Op. at 77.  Therefore, 
according to the court, Fashauer was using the testimony as an 
artificial justification for testimony rebutting Ehrenreich's 
general testimony about Fashauer's employability, as Fashauer 
must have planned to call the rebuttal witness without regard to 
whether Ehrenreich gave surprise testimony.  As the court put it, 
"[t]he only thing that was new in Dr. Ehrenreich's testimony that 
hadn't been in his original report was that he looked in the want 
ads and found a Jaguar salesman."  Id.  Therefore, the rebuttal 
witness could have been named in the pretrial report.  The court 
concluded that "what we had here was a tactical decision made by 
the plaintiff to get the last word in by withholding his own 
expert and then springing him at the end. . . . What was really 
wanted by the plaintiff was to put its vocational expert last and 
get the last shot at the jury, and I don't think that's a proper 
use of rebuttal."  Op. at 76-78. 
  
 Boiled down to its essence, the question before us is 
whether, in light of the manner of the proceedings, the district 
court erred in refusing to allow Fashauer to call a rebuttal 
witness who was not listed in the pretrial orders.  "[T]he trial 
court ha[s] the discretion to exclude testimony of a witness who 
had not been identified.  The trial court's exclusion of 
testimony because of the failure of counsel to adhere to a 
pretrial order will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
abuse of discretion."  Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1238 (3d 
Cir. 1988); see also Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 
1227, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994).  As we have explained, "[o]ne of the 
main purposes of the pretrial conference is to formulate the 
issues to be litigated to aid the parties in preparation for 
trial.  If counsel are permitted to change the positions taken at 
pretrial obviously the effectiveness of this procedure is 
destroyed."  Ely v. Reading Co., 424 F.2d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 
1970). 
 Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the district 
court's decision.  Fashauer contends that rebuttal was required 
to dispel the notion left by Ehrenreich's testimony that he was a 
malingerer.  However, the district court's finding that 
plaintiff's counsel was using the rebuttal witness to rebut 
anticipated testimony and simply get the last word, is not 
clearly erroneous.  That being the case, Fashauer "'from the 
outset of this action knew the [defendant's] contentions and the 
  
necessity for . . . rebuttal testimony could reasonably have been 
anticipated.'"  American Int'l Trading Corp. v. Petroleos 
Mexicanos, 835 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal 
alterations omitted) (alteration added) (citation omitted).  
Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion in 
refusing to allow the rebuttal expert to testify. 
 We stress that the decision to exclude the rebuttal 
expert had nothing to do with the content of Ehrenreich's 
testimony, and nothing we say should be read to approve his 
testimony.  However, the record shows that Fashauer did not 
object to the testimony, did not request a limiting instruction, 
and was intending to use the witness to rebut anticipated 
testimony rather than the surprise testimony.  Fashauer chose to 
cross-examine Ehrenreich in the hopes of discrediting him.  He 
cannot capitalize now on his tactical choice by getting improper 
rebuttal before the court.  
 
 E.  Mitigation of Damages 
 Finally, Fashauer contends that the district court 
erred in neglecting to instruct the jury that New Jersey Transit 
had the burden of proving that Fashauer failed to mitigate his 
damages.  Under the FELA, which is to be interpreted according to 
"general principles of law as administered in the federal courts 
. . . an injured plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages."  
Jones v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 
  
1986).  However, "once it is established that a duty to mitigate 
is present, the burden . . . falls on the wrongdoer to show that 
the damages were lessened or might have been lessened by the 
plaintiff."  Id. at 593; DeBiasio v. Illinois Central R.R., 52 
F.3d 678, 688 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Jackson v. City of 
Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Schneider 
v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 987 F.2d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 
1993).  The district court instructed the jury that "[p]laintiff 
. . . must try to minimize the damages due to loss of wages.  But 
extraordinary or impractical efforts are not necessary.  All that 
is required are reasonable efforts and ordinary care in trying to 
reduce the loss."  App. 963.  The district court's charge, while 
correctly stating that Fashauer had a duty to mitigate, failed to 
specify that New Jersey Transit had the burden of proof on the 
issue.  Because the mitigation language occurred in the midst of 
the court's general damages instructions, the jury could well 
have believed that Fashauer had the burden to prove mitigation.  
Therefore, the charge unquestionably was flawed. 
 However, Fashauer failed to request a charge on 
mitigation of damages, and, as the district court pointed out, 
"no one asked for that burden of proof charge.  Mr. Barish 
[plaintiff's counsel] admits, candidly, that he did not call to 
my attention at any of the various points that I have failed to 
do that."  Op. at 48. 
  
 Thus, while ordinarily an "[i]ncorrect jury instruction 
as to burden of proof 'is "fundamental and highly prejudicial" 
and requires a new trial,'" Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 730 
(3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), that principle assumes that 
the issue properly has been preserved for appeal.  The procedure 
for preserving an objection to a jury charge is governed by Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 51 which provides that: 
  At the close of the evidence . . . any 
party may file written requests that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in the requests.  The court shall 
inform counsel of its proposed action upon 
the requests prior to their arguments to the 
jury.  The court, at its election, may 
instruct the jury before or after argument, 
or both.  No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless that party objects thereto before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter objected to and the 
grounds of the objection. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (emphasis added). 
 We repeatedly have stressed the important policy 
objectives served by Rule 51.  The rule affords the trial judge 
"an opportunity to correct any error that may have been made in 
the charge before the jury begins its deliberations."  Seman v. 
Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 436 (3d Cir. 1994); Miller v. 
CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 591 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (in banc).  It 
also "lessen[s] the burden on appellate courts by diminishing the 
number of rulings at the trial which they may be called upon to 
review."  McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 769 
  
n.29 (3d Cir. 1990).  Thus, Rule 51 is consistent with the 
general rule that "an appellate court will not predicate error on 
an issue upon which the district court was not provided with an 
opportunity to rule."  Remington Rand Corp.- Delaware v. Business 
Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1267 (3d Cir. 1987).  We have followed 
this proposition strictly, and have refused to consider "newly 
developed arguments[s] concerning [a] jury charge deficiency."  
McAdam, 896 F.2d at 769; see, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 
1378 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) (declining to consider whether jury 
instruction was defective under Virgin Islands law because "th[e] 
issue was not properly preserved for appeal under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 51"), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 650 
(1993). 
 In the absence of a party's preservation of an assigned 
error for appeal, we review only for plain error, and our power 
to reverse is discretionary.  Cf. United States v. Olano, 113 
S.Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993) (interpreting Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b)).  Consequently, "our discretionary power to 
review errors in jury instructions which were not objected to at 
trial should be exercised sparingly"; otherwise we risk 
"emasculat[ing]" the important policies served by Rule 51.  
McAdam, 896 F.2d at 770 n.31 (citing Trent v. Atlantic City Elec. 
Co., 334 F.2d 847, 859 (3d Cir. 1964)).  Thus, we should notice 
the error only "'if [it] is fundamental and highly prejudicial or 
if the instructions are such that the jury is without adequate 
  
guidance on a fundamental question and our failure to consider 
the error would result in a miscarriage of justice.'"  Bereda v. 
Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 987 
(3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 506, 99 S.Ct. 
1854 (1979)); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(same). 
 We take guidance in this regard from the Supreme 
Court's recent interpretation of the Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure setting forth the plain error standard, Rule 52(b).  
The Court held that courts of appeal should exercise their 
discretion to "correct a plain forfeited error affecting 
substantial rights if the error 'seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.'"  Olano, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting United States 
v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392 (1936)).  If 
anything, the plain error power in the civil context -- which is 
judicially rather than statutorily created -- should be used even 
more sparingly.  And in keeping with this, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit has held that the doctrine "should only be 
invoked with extreme caution in the civil context."  United 
States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1188 (2d Cir. 1995).  The court 
continued: "plain error review is only appropriate in the civil 
context where the error is so serious and flagrant that it goes 
to the very integrity of the trial."  Id. (citing Brenner v. 
  
World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 79 (1980)). 
 We decline to exercise our discretion to reverse in 
this case, notwithstanding the importance of proper instructions 
on burdens of proof.  In the first place, the instruction was 
quite cursory and not at all as detailed as mitigation 
instructions usually are and should be.  The court did not tell 
the jury explicitly that Fashauer had a duty to mitigate.  The 
court did not instruct the jury how to reduce the damages if it 
found Fashauer failed to mitigate.  Thus, it seems doubtful that 
the instruction had the significance with which Fashauer endows 
it. 
 Moreover, Fashauer in his brief repeatedly confuses 
loss of future earnings capacity with the duty to mitigate 
damages.  For example, he points to the fact that the jury 
awarded no damages for future lost earnings as evidence that the 
mitigation charge prejudiced him.  But to the extent that the 
district court's mitigation charge referred to future earning 
potential, it was correct.  The defendant is obligated to prove 
failure to mitigate, but that burden only applies to damages for 
past loss of earnings -- from the time of injury to the time of 
trial.  As discussed in detail above, though, the plaintiff has 
the burden of proving future loss of earnings due to a diminished 
earnings capacity.  Gorniak, 889 F.2d at 484.  As Judge Bailey 
Brown pointed out in his concurrence in Jones v. Consolidated R. 
  
Corp., 800 F.2d at 595, the "burden [i]s on the defendant to show 
that, after his injury and prior to the trial, [plaintiff] was 
able to do some work and did not make a reasonable effort to find 
and do such work."  But the burden remains on the plaintiff to 
prove "damage[s] as a result of a decrease in earning capacity 
which will reduce future income."  Id. (Brown, J., concurring). 
 Here, the jury awarded Fashauer $71,320 for past loss 
of earnings and he does not contend that this amount was 
inadequate.  Therefore, the fact that the jury awarded nothing 
for future loss of earnings only reflects that Fashauer failed to 
prove that element of damages.  We recognize that, as in Jones, 
the district court's charge did not adequately distinguish 
between past losses and future losses, but that hardly prejudiced 
Fashauer.  And it hardly affected the integrity of the trial.  We 
reject Fashauer's argument. 
 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons detailed above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
 
